Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

would have added credibility were it accompanied by
further measures to reduce the size of its arsenal in
Europe. The size <strong>and</strong> nature of such a reduction could
be calibrated depending on whether it was taken in
parallel with, or independent of, parallel measures by
Russia.
There are several options for such a reduction.
Even if all six warhead storage locations are kept, the
United States could decide to reduce the average number
of warheads per location from 30 to, for example,
10 or 20. It could also decide to reduce the number of
facilities, for example, by closing one of the two Italian
bases or one of the three north European facilities.
Or, if it is judged that Russian reciprocal measures are
sufficient to meet the criteria set out in the Strategic
Concept, it could decide to withdraw all weapons from
Europe, with or without a formal announcement to
this effect.
A combination of parallel reduction <strong>and</strong> transparency
measures, along the lines outlined above, could
go some way towards building mutual confidence,
while avoiding the complexities involved in subsuming
these weapons within a global arms control regime.
It might also include further detailed exchanges
of information (for example, on locations of major
storage sites) that could further build confidence in
total arsenal declarations. 4 No regime currently exists
that is able to verify warhead stockpiles with the
degree of accuracy achieved in relation to deployed
missiles, <strong>and</strong> it is hard to imagine that such a regime
can easily be developed, given the ability of states
to conceal warheads (<strong>and</strong> warhead components) in
nondeclared locations. Given this, together with continuing
transparency in relation to the most sensitive
(START-counted) delivery systems, the steps outlined
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