Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

exaggerated emphasis on security in ordering their
individual <strong>and</strong> collective agendas.
Arms control must be bundled. It cannot focus
solely on TNWs, nor on strategic nuclear weapons,
nor on conventional forces. Stability concerns address
all of these as linked military implements. Today, missile
defenses <strong>and</strong> conventional strategic systems are
also linked into the equation, particularly by Russia.
Consultative <strong>and</strong> cooperative approaches to each <strong>and</strong>
all of these security issues must be incorporated into
the broadened process for achieving regional stability.
Arms control must be backed. Nations cannot opt
out. They cannot free ride. Whether the ultimate format
selected is unilateral/reciprocal, bilateral, multilateral,
or some mixture of these, the Alliance must
be engaged, <strong>and</strong> the region must be engaged, if true
stability is to be attained. In addition, those states with
internal consultative m<strong>and</strong>ates must engage those
domestic processes so as to present a legitimately national
position in the larger consultations. Participants
must carry the long-term view into the process so that
long-term stability can be the outcome.
Arms control, then, should be a primary vehicle by
which <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> its member states address the issues
surrounding security assurance, stability, U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe, <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong> as a nuclear alliance.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 18
1. Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for
the Defense <strong>and</strong> Security of the Members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, adopted by Heads of State <strong>and</strong> Government
at Lisbon, Portugal, November 19, 2010, p. 4.
2. Ibid., p. 7.
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