Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

intrigue pertaining to nuclear weapons concerned the
proposal to exp<strong>and</strong> de-escalation to one more category
of conflicts: the 2000 document had assigned nuclear
weapons only to “global” <strong>and</strong> “regional” wars, 16 but
in 2009 there was a proposal to also assign them to “local
wars.” 17 This proposal would have applied nuclear
weapons to situations like the war with Georgia in
2008 <strong>and</strong> was finally rejected. Where non-strategic nuclear
assets are concerned, the failure of the proposal
to exp<strong>and</strong> the role of nuclear missions to a new type
of conflict only confirmed that there were few, if any,
targets in the immediate vicinity of Russia.
Thus, the Russian strategy regarding use of nuclear
weapons for purposes of deterrence has not changed
since 1999 (or 2000, the year of its formal adoption).
The place of NSNWs in this strategy is not straightforward.
It appears that Russia continues to rely on
longer-range air- <strong>and</strong> sea-based NSNWs as well as
on shorter-range anti-ship <strong>and</strong> anti-submarine naval
NSNWs. The other NSNWs do not appear to have a
discernible role. In fact, Moscow is clearly not concerned
about the traditional Cold War-style largescale
invasion using traditional conventional armies.
Hence, it does not need TNWs for roles like <strong>NATO</strong>
assigned to them during the Cold War (deterrence of
tank armies). The broad assertion about Russia needing
NSNWs to compensate for weakness of its conventional
forces misses an important point: it is a different
type of conventional forces that Russia is concerned
about, forces with technologically enhanced capabilities,
hence the assets it needs to confront them are also
different.
Short-range weapons are also believed to have
another role—that of deterring Chinese conventional
forces. 18 The logic is similar to that underlying the com-
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