Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

military-technical sphere toward the preferential (for
the West) channel. 12
Another hypothesis suggests a more subtle U.S.
strategy—the so-called “Chinese gambit,” whereby
America gains Russia’s concurrence on substantial
bilateral reductions in nuclear weapons, leading to a
weakening of Russia’s global position. It would downgrade
Russia to sixth or seventh place in the geostrategic
hierarchy. As one commentator states, “In this case
conditions will appear for channelizing the aspirations
of . . . China in a northern direction, thus making it
clash with Russia. As a result, two major geopolitical
competitors (Russia <strong>and</strong> China) would supposedly be
out of action for the foreseeable future.” 13
According to yet another suspicion, Americans
are suggesting the exchange of numerical data <strong>and</strong>
subsequent concentration of TNWs in a few centralized
depots as a ruse for gathering data to support
U.S. first-strike targeting. This idea is quite prevalent
among Russian military comm<strong>and</strong>ers. Similarly, in
their view, the real purpose of BMD in Europe is to
deny Russia a retaliatory capability in the event of
a nuclear attack from the West. The more authentic
concern of western arms control experts is that, owing
to the wide dispersal <strong>and</strong> lack of guaranteed security
of TNW warheads, terrorists may acquire them. Such
an eventuality does not worry Russian strategists as
much as imagined American “treachery.” In the same
vein, western reservations concerning the amended
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty are allegedly
rooted in a barely hidden <strong>and</strong> one-sided desire to
maintain <strong>NATO</strong> conventional superiority, especially
in high-precision weapons.
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