Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

the potential value of British weapons in any extended
deterrence linkage, as the British weapons are—in
contrast to the French arsenal—declared to <strong>NATO</strong>. It
could also increase the potential value of Britain to the
United States as a strategic partner if the UK were to
remain a willing host of U.S. weapons in certain contingencies.
Many in Washington still remember when
the British government of Margaret Thatcher, in 1986,
allowed U.S. forces to use British bases <strong>and</strong> airspace
to launch (albeit conventional) air strikes against
Libya, when no other European ally would. In addition,
nuclear weapons cooperation is one area where
the much-vaunted (on the British side at least) “special
relationship” really is special. But the dynamics of
any move to denuclearize the other European <strong>NATO</strong>
members could also have an impact on the nuclear
weapons debate—such as it is—in Britain.
Britain has long since given up its own tactical nuclear
weapons. The WE177 munition was taken out of
service with the Royal Navy in 1992, <strong>and</strong> withdrawn
from service with the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1998.
The country’s only remaining nuclear weapon is the
submarine-based Trident strategic system. Strictly
speaking, the issues of the future of <strong>NATO</strong>’s tactical
weapons <strong>and</strong> that of the UK strategic force are entirely
separate. Yet the fortunes of the former could
have some ripple effect on the prospects for the latter.
Britain’s Trident force is currently based on four
Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines. While the
British government is especially secretive about many
aspects of its nuclear weapons capabilities, it (like the
United States) has moved ahead of <strong>NATO</strong> in certain
aspects of transparency <strong>and</strong> declaratory policy. In
May 2010, the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat
coalition government revealed that the UK’s nuclear
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