Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council on nuclear confidence-building <strong>and</strong> transparency.
Involving China—<strong>and</strong> eventually the other
nuclear-armed states India, Israel, <strong>and</strong> Pakistan—in
an arms control dialogue could also go some way towards
addressing the long-term problem of preserving
the strategic balances under conditions of nuclear
disarmament. In the end, the real challenge will be to
assure others that regional military imbalances <strong>and</strong>
U.S. conventional supremacy are no threats to international
stability <strong>and</strong> security.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11
1. Final Document of the 2010 <strong>Nuclear</strong> Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong>, NPT/CONF.2010/50,
Vol. I, New York, 2010.
2. William J. Perry <strong>and</strong> James R. Schlesinger, Final Report of the
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, “Executive
Summary,” Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, May 2009.
3. <strong>Nuclear</strong> Posture Review Report, Washington, DC: Department
of Defense, April 2010, p. xiii.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. James Cartwright, Meeting on <strong>Nuclear</strong> Posture Review,
Council of Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, April 8, 2010.
7. Hans Kristensen <strong>and</strong> Robert S. Norris, “U.S. <strong>Tactical</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong>
<strong>Weapons</strong> in Europe,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67,
No. 1, 2011, pp. 64ff.
8. <strong>NATO</strong> New Strategic Concept: Active Engagement, Modern Defense,
Lisbon, Portugal, November 2010.
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