Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe will continue
to serve as a deterrent against any Russian temptation
to exploit the presence of its NSNWs to threaten, intimidate,
or coerce <strong>NATO</strong> allies or others, especially
in crisis. The continued presence of U.S. nuclear weapons
in Europe will provide Allies with sufficient assurance
to deter them from developing their own nuclear
weapons capabilities. So far as the DDPR in Chicago is
concerned, Roberts expresses the view that when the
dust has settled, “the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe
[will be] affirmed.”
The circumstances under which nuclear weapons
might be employed in a European crisis or conflict
have changed dramatically with the end of the Cold
War. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, invoked
in response to the September 11, 2001, strike on the
United States, remains very much in force. Russia has
promulgated a new first-use doctrine for its non-strategic
nuclear weapons as a means to “de-escalate” a
conflict or crisis that it considers to be a threat to Russia
<strong>and</strong> its people. It has practiced this doctrine in exercises;
some speculate that it does so to compensate
for its inferiority in conventional military capabilities.
In stark contrast to the Cold War discussions of how
“Flexible Response” might play out in the face of a
Warsaw Pact attack, the kinds of contingencies under
which <strong>NATO</strong> might employ its nuclear weapons today
attract few discussants. Perhaps this reticence is
the result of the underlying reality that <strong>NATO</strong> nuclear
weapons are in fact “used” every day that they deter
others from employing them against <strong>NATO</strong> members.
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