Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

objectives <strong>and</strong> outcomes—or simply improve
the atmosphere for dialogue. Conversely,
failures, or just a lack of successes, can weigh
heavily on prospects elsewhere. This is little
more than an application to social dynamics of
Newton’s first law (a body at rest tends to stay
at rest, while a body in motion tends to stay
in motion). In the most recent case, efforts to
capitalize on the conclusion of the New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) have
been openly <strong>and</strong> undisguisedly applied to the
CFE impasse—though without apparent effect
to date. The Senate’s conditions for ratification
of New START instruct a similar derivative
effort in controlling NSNWs—which, having
arguably suffered more from inattention than
disagreement, may be more fertile ground, at
least for now. And, as the intermediate rung
on the deterrence ladder, there may be some
appeal in the logic of addressing it first, in the
course of advancing more vigorously from the
successful strategic nuclear case to the deadlocked
conventional one. Obviously other political
considerations (like election cycles) may
affect specific timing, but a road map remains
in order.
CONCLUSIONS
A conventional arms control perspective offers a
number of implications for approaches to the issue of
NSNWs in <strong>NATO</strong>. The most salient (<strong>and</strong> urgent) of
these seems to be an updated threat assessment for
NSNW planning, providing a logical model for both
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