Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ather divergent opinions. Some argue that these actions
can be legitimate as an initial step, but only after
an official agreement on the conduct of negotiations.
But others, such as the earlier-mentioned academician,
Anatoliy D’yakov, go a bit further:
Russia, the U.S., <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong> could have agreed on coordinated
transparency measures.…In particular, it is
possible to exchange information on the numbers <strong>and</strong>
places of storage of operational nuclear warheads <strong>and</strong>
take the obligation to keep these warheads in declared
places only, as well as to have no plans of transferring
the warheads from reserve to operational status. 17
The history of nuclear disarmament in Europe
tells us that practical measures to reduce TNWs are
possible even without formal agreements (see Table
6-1). Twenty years ago, in the late 1980s <strong>and</strong> early
1990s, the American <strong>and</strong> Soviet leaderships were able
to adopt major unilateral decisions in the interests
of common peace <strong>and</strong> security in Europe. Today the
situation is different. In Russia, disappointment over
the dissolution of the Soviet Union prevails, a mood
of distrust of the West is widespread, <strong>and</strong> harsh Cold
War rhetoric creeps in: “Alas, under Gorbachev the
Russians stopped believing in universal human values.
Russians became used to seeing dirty tricks <strong>and</strong>
detecting double st<strong>and</strong>ards. And in recent years, the
Americans have regularly provided reasons [for our
suspecting deceit].” 18
168