27.04.2015 Views

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

trati<strong>on</strong>s of forces led to the original CFE Treaty’s geographic<br />

structure of limitati<strong>on</strong>, to the adapted Treaty’s<br />

nati<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> territorial c<strong>on</strong>struct, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> to the VDoc’s<br />

thresholds for notifying <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> observing, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> its c<strong>on</strong>straints<br />

<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>ducting military activities—including<br />

stati<strong>on</strong>ing <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> activities within nati<strong>on</strong>al territory. On<br />

the other h<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>, basic principles of h<strong>on</strong>oring nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />

sovereignty were embedded in the CFE Treaty, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

reinforced in its Adaptati<strong>on</strong> Agreement, in the form of<br />

requiring formal host nati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sent for the stati<strong>on</strong>ing<br />

of forces outside nati<strong>on</strong>al territory.<br />

In the first instance, the parties have accepted<br />

limits <strong>on</strong> their own sovereignty by adopting ceilings<br />

<strong>on</strong> the amounts of forces they may hold in the area<br />

of applicati<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>, derivatively, where those forces<br />

may be located, by z<strong>on</strong>e or territory. In a couple of<br />

cases of disproporti<strong>on</strong>ately large geography <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> force<br />

size (i.e., Russia <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ukraine), z<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> territorial<br />

boundaries cut across nati<strong>on</strong>al boundaries to establish<br />

further sublimits <strong>on</strong> force c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> in sensitive<br />

areas. Enter the enduring “flank” debate, whereby<br />

Russia has perennially chafed at these sublimits as an<br />

infringement <strong>on</strong> its sovereignty—which of course it is,<br />

like all the other provisi<strong>on</strong>s of the Treaty (<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> treaties<br />

in general)—hence the need for its agreement, signature,<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> ratificati<strong>on</strong>. Nevertheless, the debate goes<br />

<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> has loomed large in Russia’s “suspensi<strong>on</strong>” of<br />

its CFE obligati<strong>on</strong>s since December 2007.<br />

Looming even larger, in the sec<strong>on</strong>d instance, is the<br />

issue of host nati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sent, hung up <strong>on</strong> the residual<br />

Russian presence in Georgia <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> Moldova, which<br />

combined with the flank issue essentially to derail the<br />

CFE Adaptati<strong>on</strong> Agreement, resulting eventually in<br />

Russia “suspending” its participati<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> in turn the<br />

reciprocal countermeasures recently undertaken by<br />

448

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!