Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ut in contrast to U.S. <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong> concerns, they trust
the security of their national stockpiles of TNWs <strong>and</strong>
discount western worries about the possibility of Russian
tactical weapons falling into terrorist h<strong>and</strong>s in the
near time frame.
GENERAL IMPLICATIONS
The dispute seems to be stalemated, with both
sides, especially the Russians, unlikely to take the first
big step forward. On both sides, there are too many
factors <strong>and</strong> too many interests linked to TNWs to allow
for a bold move any time soon. Some Russian experts
describe the situation in stark terms: the start of
negotiations on TNWs between the United States <strong>and</strong>
Russia is unlikely in the near future. For instance, one
of the most authoritative Russian experts, Anatoliy
D’yakov, who is a corresponding member of the Russian
Academy of Sciences <strong>and</strong> Director of the Center
for Studies of Problems of Disarmament, Energy, <strong>and</strong>
Ecology at Moscow’s Physical-Technical Institute,
recently opined that “at the moment negotiations on
non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) have little
prospect of starting.” 15
Thus further present attempts to persuade Russia
to start negotiations on significant overall reductions
of its TNW arsenal <strong>and</strong> the number/location of their
storage sites, without major quid pro quo, have a distinctly
low probability of success:
In light of the continued decrease in <strong>NATO</strong> TNWs
<strong>and</strong> strong public support for eliminating the remaining
[<strong>NATO</strong>] weapons, some Russian analysts could
plausibly anticipate that European governments
might at some point request their removal regardless
of Moscow`s response. This perception naturally
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