Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

PROSPECTS FOR A U.S.-RUSSIAN TREATY ON
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In May 2011, Vladimir Kozin, Chief of the Section
of Analysis <strong>and</strong> Forecasting of the Department of All-
Asian Problems of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
outlined five obstacles to a U.S.-Russian treaty limiting
TNWs. Kozin, a frequent commentator on strategic
arms negotiations, European missile defense, <strong>and</strong>
TNWs negotiations, sees limiting TNWs as a complex
issue that satisfactory progress in the other areas affects.
Kozin declared: “Russia should not, by any
means, permit an erosion of its position.” 60 This hardline
view did not promise much room for negotiations.
The five obstacles mentioned by Kozin included,
first, defining what is meant precisely by tactical systems,
the absence of any preceding arms control regime
for such systems, <strong>and</strong> the fact that the tactical
arsenals of other major nuclear powers (Great Britain,
France, <strong>and</strong> China), <strong>and</strong> de facto nuclear powers (Israel,
India, <strong>and</strong> Pakistan) will have to be part of the negotiations
process on such tactical nuclear systems. 61
Second, Kozin sees the asymmetric deployment postures
of U.S. <strong>and</strong> Russian forces as an inhibiting factor
to negotiations. U.S. forces are deployed in allied
states in Europe, <strong>and</strong> the United States maintains a
theater infrastructure to support such weapons. As
Foreign Minister Lavrov has pointed out, negotiations
on TNWs cannot begin until U.S. TNWs <strong>and</strong> infrastructure
are removed from Europe. Russia will not
respond positively to pressure from <strong>NATO</strong> states or
others to de-nuclearize Kaliningrad Oblast. 62 The third
major obstacle is the issue of prescribed accounting of
TNWs. The United States wants this done in advance
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