Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

mediate postwar period. Washington’s response was
to seek to restrain these allies. With Tokyo, Washington’s
response was to ensure the substantial demilitarization
of the nation, with the United States assuming
responsibility for Japan’s security interests beyond its
immediate territory. Though after the beginning of the
Korean War, Washington did encourage the development
of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to aid in the
defense of the Home Isl<strong>and</strong>s. As Japan enthusiastically
embraced its pacification, concerns about a belligerent
Japan receded but the model held, convenient for both
parties. With often truculent South Korea <strong>and</strong> Taiwan,
the United States sought to retain sufficient control
over their military activities to ensure that they did
not provoke an unwanted war in Asia. To this end, the
United States, in Victor Cha’s description, “fashioned
a series of deep, tight bilateral alliances with Taiwan,
South Korea, <strong>and</strong> Japan to control their ability to use
force <strong>and</strong> to foster material <strong>and</strong> political dependency
on the United States.” 36 Ensuring exclusive U.S. control
over nuclear weapons policy was of a piece with
this larger approach.
But the approach was not purely a product of
Washington’s insistence. Rather, Asian allies did not
challenge <strong>and</strong> in some respects even insisted on the
maintenance of a hierarchical alliance relationship
with Washington. The case of Japan is illustrative,
where the “see no evil, hear no evil” posture of the
Japanese Government with respect to U.S. nuclear
weapons became as much a consequence of Tokyo’s
preferences as Washington’s. In the wake of the devastating
war with the United States that had concluded
with incendiary <strong>and</strong> atomic attacks on the Home Isl<strong>and</strong>s,
Japan elected to pursue the “Yoshida Doctrine”
of unitary focus on economic growth <strong>and</strong> unswerving
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