Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

deterrence <strong>and</strong> defense are not necessarily antinuclear
pacifists.
• In the wake of dem<strong>and</strong>ing operations that have
exposed rifts among Allies over the equitable
sharing of risks <strong>and</strong> burdens, approaches that
shift responsibilities for maintaining <strong>NATO</strong>
NSNWs to a smaller <strong>and</strong> smaller number of Allies
are bound to chip away at a sense of solidarity.
Hence, if reductions in overall <strong>NATO</strong>
NSNW capabilities are contemplated, it might
be preferable to fashion so-called horizontal or
salami-slicing cutbacks (that is, spreading reductions
over several basing countries) rather
than vertical ones (whereby some Allies drop
out of nuclear roles entirely, effectively shifting
all their burden to others).
• Smart Defense will be hard enough to apply to
conventional capabilities; applying it to nuclear
burden-sharing may be too difficult to achieve
in the present political climate. Given sovereignty
<strong>and</strong> assured-access issues, the achievement
of multinational cooperation appears
more difficult the closer the project comes to
affecting combat capabilities versus functions
such as logistics, maintenance, training, <strong>and</strong>
professional military education. Hence, while
the concept of creating a multinational, dualcapable
air unit to assume the role now played
by European Allies with national dual-capable
forces may seem attractive in theory, the political
<strong>and</strong> practical obstacles to realizing such
a project should not be underestimated.
• The hard realities of defense austerity will not
disappear anytime soon. Thus, it is legitimate
for Allies to ask themselves <strong>and</strong> each other
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