Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Paradoxically, transparency itself does not elicit
much opposition, especially among the professional
military. Resistance seems rather to reflect embarrassment
at publicly announcing very high figures
(<strong>and</strong> possibly confirming that unofficial estimates of
the Russian NSNW arsenal are reasonably accurate).
This putative embarrassment was probably the main
reason why Russia did not divulge official data about
its nuclear stockpile following the U.S. example in the
spring of 2010 at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Review Conference. Unofficially, members of the Russian
delegation indicated that Moscow would soon
do the same <strong>and</strong> even expressed irritation that Washington
went ahead with its announcement without
coordinating it with Moscow. Almost two years later,
however, the figures have still not been published.
The third popular Western proposal—the withdrawal
of NSNWs away from the border with <strong>NATO</strong>
appears the most broadly acceptable, except to the
Navy. As a rule, the Russian military responds with
the question, How far from the border? It appears
reluctant to withdraw NSNWs to an area beyond the
Urals because China could interpret that as a hostile
move. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, the military seems quite relaxed
about withdrawal by a shorter distance (beyond
the Volga, for example). The Navy is an exception here
again—the bulk of its NSNWs are at the bases of the
Northern Fleet right across the border from Norway.
These weapons cannot be moved because the Navy
does not have bases further east, so it also argues
against proposals involving withdrawal.
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