Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

The second track is an effort to develop a cooperative
partnership with Russia. This track is h<strong>and</strong>led in the
<strong>NATO</strong>-Russia Council (NRC) where it would appear
that little progress has been made in agreeing on even
the basic parameters of cooperation. This work in the
NRC has no input into the DDPR. However, whether
there is success or failure in this cooperation is crucial
to other areas of the DDPR because Russia has made
clear that it regards cooperation in missile defense as
a condition for cooperation in other areas.
Arms Control <strong>and</strong> Disarmament.
The work of the new <strong>Weapons</strong> of Mass Destruction
Control <strong>and</strong> Disarmament Committee (WCDC) is still
in its early stages, <strong>and</strong>, while its exact terms of reference
remain ill defined, the battlelines have already
been drawn. Several countries would like <strong>NATO</strong> to
adopt a more positive approach towards arms control
<strong>and</strong> disarmament in support of the Prague agenda
<strong>and</strong> the <strong>Nuclear</strong> Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
They are looking for ways to enhance the salience of
the Alliance in this field. This goal is problematic, as
arms control agreements fall within the competence
of national governments. Other countries are opposed
to this emphasis on disarmament, which they consider
inappropriate for a defense alliance <strong>and</strong> which
in their view risks distracting attention from, <strong>and</strong> at
worst weakening, the primary purpose of the Alliance.
France is firmly opposed to a higher profile for
disarmament <strong>and</strong> against extending the duration of
the Committee.
There is general agreement, however, that if <strong>and</strong>
when the United States <strong>and</strong> Russia resume arms control
negotiations that include sub-strategic systems,
the WCDC Committee would provide a forum for the
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