Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

the previous rationale for deployment—the need to
counter the Soviet Army deployed in the heart of Germany—has
long since disappeared.
As in the 1980s, insistence on withdrawal of U.S.
nuclear forces on European territory is not driven primarily
by a belief in the likelihood of reciprocation,
either by Russia or by non-nuclear nonaligned states.
Rather, it is rooted in a belief that nuclear weapons
are inherently distasteful <strong>and</strong> dangerous, <strong>and</strong> are, at
best, a temporary necessity when faced by evident
<strong>and</strong> immediate threats. The lack of any openly-argued
operational role for these weapons is, from this point
of view, a clear argument for their withdrawal. In
contrast to those who point to the importance of U.S.
nuclear weapons in Europe as symbols of transatlantic
burden-sharing <strong>and</strong> reassurance, these critics put
more emphasis on the symbolic importance of demonstrating
<strong>NATO</strong>’s commitment to disarmament.
In the absence of major new threats to European security,
<strong>and</strong> in light of the opposition to continuing nuclear
deployment in key hosting countries, it appears
likely that these weapons will have to be withdrawn
at some stage over the next decade or so. But this will
not happen without a fight. Supporters of the existing
arrangements have been vocal in expressing concern
that nuclear withdrawal could undermine the credibility
of <strong>NATO</strong>’s commitment to nuclear deterrence
more generally, <strong>and</strong> would be especially damaging
if carried out without substantial reciprocation from
Russia. They view anti-nuclear feelings in Germany,
in particular, as part of a broader European reluctance
to share security burdens that, in their view, are being
borne disproportionately by the United States. They
have powerful allies in <strong>NATO</strong>’s new member states
(especially in the Baltic republics) who view nuclear
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