Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

on a modified CFE regime <strong>and</strong> a follow-on accord
to the New START treaty; <strong>and</strong>,
• Both sides should reach an underst<strong>and</strong>ing
about which areas, for the time being, will not
be subject to arms control or restrictions. The
list might include conventional strategic weapons
such as submarine launched cruise missiles
or PGS systems.
In the short term, progress on arms control will
hinge on the willingness of <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> Russia to
agree on a joint approach to ballistic missile defenses
(BMD). The stakes are high, yet <strong>NATO</strong>’s commitment
to develop an Alliance-wide system <strong>and</strong> Russia’s insistence
on becoming an equal partner in the undertaking
appear to have set both sides on a collision
course. <strong>NATO</strong> would be well-advised to allow more
time for consultations with Moscow because there
is no urgent military requirement to deploy missile
defenses in Europe. Russia, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, needs
to recognize that it will not become <strong>NATO</strong>’s equal
partner in missile defense, but that BMD cooperation
allows further steps to establish common missile defense
early warning <strong>and</strong> data-sharing. Establishing a
data exchange center with <strong>NATO</strong> could be a decisive
confidence-building step forward to enhance cooperation
on BMD in Europe. 33
While they are trying to improve their own bilateral
relationship, <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> Russia also need to reach
out to China since agreements between Russia <strong>and</strong>
<strong>NATO</strong> have a potential impact on security in Asia.
Beijing’s experience with arms control is extremely
limited. To draw China further into the arms control
<strong>and</strong> confidence-building process, <strong>NATO</strong> could for example
propose to intensify discussions among the five
274