Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ventional alternatives are operationally <strong>and</strong> politically
preferable. Modern conventional weapons have
become extremely accurate <strong>and</strong> powerful, <strong>and</strong> these
are deemed capable of efficiently responding to most
threats to the security of the Alliance. In the words of a
senior official at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
“I cannot think of any mission that cannot be accomplished
with other means. The value of these weapons
is today essentially political.” 12 It is difficult to envisage
a realistic scenario in which all <strong>NATO</strong> members,
including Germany <strong>and</strong> the Sc<strong>and</strong>inavian countries,
could reach consensus on employing nuclear weapons
against any target. Indeed, even in a worst-case
scenario that requires the actual use of nuclear capabilities,
it is difficult to imagine that <strong>NATO</strong>—<strong>and</strong>,
especially, its strongest member, the United States—
would resort to TNWs hosted in Europe when faster,
more accurate, longer-range U.S. strategic nuclear
weapons based at sea or on American soil are available
<strong>and</strong> ready to launch. 13
TNWs thus appear short on credibility as weapons
of any real military value. If this is the case, their deterrent
potential is also seriously compromised. Furthermore,
adding the French <strong>and</strong> UK nuclear arsenals
to that of the United States, <strong>NATO</strong> would remain a
formidable nuclear alliance even if the few hundred
remaining TNWs were withdrawn from Europe.
Supporting Nonproliferation <strong>and</strong> Disarmament.
The debate about the forward deployment of
U.S. tactical weapons must be seen in the context of
the increasing international support for the program
of nuclear disarmament, which is finding adherents
throughout Europe. 14 Despite caveats <strong>and</strong> different
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