Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

their national interests so dictate, may be disinclined
to invest in cooperative programs in the absence of
assured access to those capabilities in the event of a
crisis. In other words, they will be loath to join <strong>and</strong>/or
fund cooperative projects on capabilities if one Ally or
more can block consensus to permit their use.
Moreover, Smart Defense will not be a panacea
for the capabilities shortfalls that likely will bedevil
the Alliance for years to come. European pooling <strong>and</strong>
sharing of its sparse ISR assets, for example, will not
appreciably lessen Europe’s overall dependence on
U.S. systems, especially in the event of high-intensity
conflicts. Yet European investment to develop major
new ISR capabilities would be very costly, making it
an unlikely (or, at best, highly selective) option in the
predicted economic <strong>and</strong> financial environment.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NSNW DEBATE
With Alliance solidarity under strain from so many
different directions, <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> member government
officials will need to tread carefully in framing any
next steps on NSNWs. What might such caution mean
in practice? Here are a few (admittedly modest) suggestions:
• Allies should avoid denigrating the threat perceptions
of others. Those favoring a go-slow approach—for
example, seeking agreement with
Russia on meaningful transparency measures
rather than proceeding directly to changes in
<strong>NATO</strong> declaratory policy or negotiated reductions—are
not necessarily paranoid vis-à-vis
Moscow’s (or perhaps Tehran’s) longer-term
intentions. 9 Conversely, those who question
the specific contributions of <strong>NATO</strong> NSNWs to
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