Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

the nuclear discussions apply only to nuclear weapons
assigned to <strong>NATO</strong>. 7 While there were quibbles
over the choice of the term “assigned,” it is clear that
this excludes French forces <strong>and</strong> that France will not
participate in the discussions of <strong>NATO</strong>’s nuclear arrangements
in the HLG <strong>and</strong> NPG working groups.
However, the French Ambassador will participate in
the NAC discussions that will produce the final DDPR
document. These arrangements imply a separation
between the purpose <strong>and</strong> the operational implementation
of nuclear weapons that is not always easy to
achieve <strong>and</strong> could be a source of confusion.
In its general approach, France can be said to
be firmly in the camp of those who are opposed to
change <strong>and</strong> will resist any move that could be seen as
weakening nuclear deterrence, including any change
to declaratory policy. French officials usually refrain
from commenting on the specific issue of <strong>NATO</strong>’s
sub-strategic systems as being none of their business.
However, French officials are known to support the
existing arrangements, among other reasons as a way
of avoiding their own singularity in terms of having
nuclear weapons on continental European territory.
Their position on <strong>NATO</strong> force posture is best described
as st<strong>and</strong>ing on the sidelines but making encouraging
noises to those who participate in the mission. 8
New <strong>NATO</strong> Members.
The more recent <strong>NATO</strong> members are against
change, as for them the presence of U.S. nuclear warheads
unambiguously couples the U.S. nuclear deterrent
to Europe <strong>and</strong> symbolizes the link with the
United States—which were the driving forces behind
their desire to join <strong>NATO</strong>. Some are willing to consid-
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