Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

experiences of war, in a less morally paradoxical direction,
which would not favor the attacker <strong>and</strong> not
necessarily involve the destruction of cities. 4 This
uncertainty about how exactly TNWs would be employed
in war (or, more accurately, how wars involving
TNWs would turn out) has meant that development
<strong>and</strong> deployment of TNWs has been marked by
various reports <strong>and</strong> officially endorsed strategies attempting
to impose rational order on their use. Such
doctrines have over time been forced to accept that
control may be impossible in the nuclear spiral which
would follow TNW use—<strong>and</strong> that their deterrent role
is probably stronger as a result. 5
In 1949 General Omar Bradley speculated that
“the A Bomb in its tactical aspect may well contribute
towards a stable equilibrium of forces since it tends
to strengthen the defensive army.” Oppenheimer
similarly hoped that “battle would be brought back
to the battlefield.” The U.S. Air Force’s Project Vista,
conducted in 1951, predicted that synergies between
battlefield weapons <strong>and</strong> small conventional forces
would work to defend Europe against overwhelming
Soviet forces.
These calculations were later repeatedly disconfirmed
by exercise experiments <strong>and</strong> analytical work,
but the efficacy of TNWs was over-estimated owing
to a number of factors. Staring into the dawning Cold
War, American strategists concluded in the far-reaching
National Security Council (NSC) Paper NSC 68
that there was no alternative to achieving a “preponderance
of power” 6 —both conventional <strong>and</strong> nuclear—
to back the strategy of containment which would otherwise
be simply a bluff. Truman signed NSC 68 into
policy in September 1950. Achieving <strong>and</strong> maintaining
this preponderance would require maximum use of
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