Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Under present conditions, the range of options
for the West in dealing with Russia’s NSNWs may
include (1) negotiated force limitations <strong>and</strong> reductions
provided some conditions are met; <strong>and</strong> (2) confidence-building
measures. Both options would have a
potentially large impact on Russia, since it maintains
a larger number of NSNWs. Reciprocity may be difficult
given different interests <strong>and</strong> stockpile structures.
Concerning the numbers of weapons, the disparity
between the United States <strong>and</strong> Russia, mentioned
earlier, is quite problematic. Given the estimate that
the United States in the near future will have only
about 500 NSNWs compared to Russia’s 2,000, any
limit around 500 would result in reductions only on
the Russian side, which is unacceptable to Moscow.
On the other h<strong>and</strong>, any limit above 500 would leave
Russia with a de facto numerical advantage, assuming
the United States was unlikely to increase the number
of its NSNWs. That situation, surely, would be unacceptable
to Washington.
THE REDUCTION OF NSNWs AND NON-
DEPLOYED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS
Before going into detail about weapons reduction,
it should be noted that owing to the reasons mentioned
above, Russia’s attitude to reductions remains
cool. Thus, if western nations want Russia to make
some concessions on NSNWs issues, they should be
receptive to progress concerning other issues on the
Russian-U.S./<strong>NATO</strong> agenda, including the weaponization
of space, non-nuclear strategic offensive
weapons, missile defense, <strong>and</strong> conventional forces in
Europe. It is a long-st<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> oft-repeated position
of the Russian government that progress on those
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