Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

has rested upon their operational value as warfighting
tools against the threat of invasion by a neighbor. But
their current value appears to be diminishing, indeed,
some analysts <strong>and</strong> politicians even see them as impediments
on the road to Global Zero. Yet the United
States is caught in the challenging position of having
to continue guaranteeing security to other states,
while facing uncertainty over the future of weapons
that have traditionally served to show such a commitment
to its friends <strong>and</strong> partners. In short, NSNWs
may be obsolete, but at this point they still serve some
modest purposes that argue against their elimination
in the short term. In fact, as consensus builds for the
proposition that any nuclear use would have strategic
significance, thus rendering inappropriate such a
term as “non-strategic” nuclear weapons, these weapons
<strong>and</strong> their delivery systems may come to be seen
in the future simply as one implement in the strategic
forces toolbox available for a president’s use in crises
or conflicts.
BACKGROUND
The United States has adopted a defense-in-depth
security concept since the dawn of the nuclear age.
In simple terms, this means that when dealing with
the possibility of nuclear attack by some nation-state
or of nuclear terrorism by some nonstate actor, the
United States will first attempt to prevent the spread
of dangerous materials <strong>and</strong> know-how to other states
via nonproliferation policies. If, despite our best nonproliferation
efforts, a potential adversary succeeds in
arming itself with nuclear weapons, the United States
will attempt to persuade the other party that it has no
chance of winning a war with the United States even
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