Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

The Russian inventory has been reduced by at least 75
percent since 1991, down from an estimated 15,000-
21,700 weapons at the time. In the 1990s, all of Russia’s
remaining non-strategic weapons were placed in
central storage, in the sites operated by the 12th Main
Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, <strong>and</strong>
are not deployed with delivery vehicles. 23 The chapter
by Nikolai Sokov provides a more detailed discussion
on the numbers of Russian NSNWs.
The status of NSNWs in Russian military strategy
is critical. Under the present circumstances they are
practically the only means of guaranteeing Russia’s
independence <strong>and</strong> territorial integrity. As Chief of the
Russian General Staff Army General Nikolai Makarov
said at the annual meeting with foreign military attaches
accredited in Moscow, Russia (December 2008),
“We consider NSNW as a deterrence factor for the
huge amount of conventional <strong>and</strong> highly precision
arms in possession of <strong>NATO</strong> countries in Europe.” 24
According to Russian military strategy, nuclear
forces have two types of missions: traditional strategic
deterrence, which relies primarily on strategic
weapons, <strong>and</strong> limited-use nuclear forces in response
to a large-scale conventional attack. Both missions
are reflected in the Military Doctrine of the Russian
Federation which says that nuclear weapons may be
used: (1) “in response to the utilization of nuclear <strong>and</strong>
other types of weapons of mass destruction against it
<strong>and</strong> (or) its allies,” <strong>and</strong> (2) “in the event of aggression
against the Russian Federation involving the use of
conventional weapons when the very existence of the
state is placed under threat.” 25
The main reason for Russia’s need for longer-range
NSNWs is that long-range precision-guided conventional
weapons provide a key advantage for the Unit-
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