Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

get missiles on <strong>NATO</strong> countries hosting U.S. missile
defense elements, fuel this concern.
It is doubtful that the DDPR will resolve the differences
among Alliance members regarding threat
perceptions <strong>and</strong> the need for U.S. nuclear weapons,
<strong>and</strong> doubtful as well that it will go on to produce a
final decision on whether or not U.S. nuclear weapons
should remain deployed in Europe. It is more likely
that the review will defer difficult questions—the DCA
issue could be kicked down the road as the Tornado
will remain in the German inventory until 2020-25—
<strong>and</strong> include language, building on that in the Strategic
Concept, linking measures on U.S. NSNWs to steps by
Russia regarding its non-strategic arsenal.
Such an outcome may be desirable for preserving
flexibility for U.S. negotiators in a future negotiation
with the Russians. If <strong>NATO</strong> were to decide at the
Chicago summit to remove some or all U.S. NSNWs
from Europe, that would reduce the bargaining chips
in the U.S. negotiators’ h<strong>and</strong>s. If the Alliance were alternatively
to decide that some U.S. nuclear weapons
must remain in Europe for the foreseeable future, that
would make it difficult for U.S. negotiators to explore
what Russia might offer for removal of the B-61 bombs.
Russian Views on Non-Strategic <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong>.
Although President Medvedev committed along
with President Obama in April 2009 to a step-by-step
process aimed at reducing, <strong>and</strong> ultimately eliminating,
nuclear weapons, the Russians in 2011 showed
little enthusiasm for engaging in early negotiations on
further nuclear arms reductions of any kind. Instead,
Moscow linked further reductions to concurrent or
prior steps on a range of other questions. On March 1,
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