Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

with nuclear weapons, <strong>and</strong> that it would be foolhardy
<strong>and</strong> cost-prohibitive to even contemplate such an effort.
Should dissuasion fail, U.S. policymakers may
consider taking preemptive military action to destroy
the threat before it can materialize. Such efforts are categorized
as a type of counterproliferation. Simultaneously,
it has long been U.S. policy to deter that adversary
from considering taking military action against
the United States, its interests, or its allies through
sowing fear, that is, through the threat of unacceptable
retaliation in response to such an attack. This concept
will surely remain a cornerstone of U.S. policy. Some
anti-nuclear commentators go so far as to suggest that
deterring nuclear use by an adversary may be the only
legitimate purpose of such an arsenal. Should deterrence
fail, however, the United States would rely on
active defenses to intercept <strong>and</strong> blunt an attack, <strong>and</strong>
on passive defenses to protect the homel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the
population from the effects of nuclear weaponry. Finally,
should a strike reach the American homel<strong>and</strong>
anyway, the concept of consequence management
takes over, encompassing clean-up, response, attribution,
<strong>and</strong> retribution for the attack.
<strong>Nuclear</strong> weapons, like all military force, can serve
a number of purposes. In particular, they can be used
for actual combat operations in their warfighting role,
or they can be used to convince an adversary that he
cannot achieve his objectives or will face devastating
retaliation if he tries. If this latter purpose is pursued
successfully, it would obviate the use of nuclear
weapons in anger. This is what we call deterrence, the
prime purpose of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of
most nation states that possess them today. 3 Unfortunately,
there are some states <strong>and</strong> nonstate actors in the
world today that may decide to pursue nuclear weap-
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