Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

unsettled by the rapidity, sophistication, <strong>and</strong> scale of
China’s military buildup. These concerns intensified
in 2009-10 as China brazenly flexed its muscles, browbeating
Japan over the disputed Senkaku Isl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong>
becoming increasingly assertive about its territorial
claims in the South China Sea. At the same time, the
less stellar outcome of the second war with Iraq <strong>and</strong>
the economic slump that afflicted the United States after
the financial crisis of 2008 began to sap confidence
in the solidity of the American security guarantee.
Even as the United States pledged under both
the Bush <strong>and</strong> Barack Obama administrations to seek
ways to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons still
further by fielding advanced conventional weapons
<strong>and</strong> missile defenses, these anxieties led to a rejuvenation
of interest in nuclear deterrence, including tactical
nuclear weapons, among key U.S. allies. 25 In South
Korea, some credible voices began calling for the reintroduction
of U.S. nuclear weapons on the peninsula
to menace North Korea <strong>and</strong> provide a bargaining chip
in negotiations on Pyongyang’s nuclear program. 26 In
Japan, meanwhile, the threat posed by North Korea
<strong>and</strong>, ultimately more importantly, by a rising China
strengthened the cohort calling for an independent
Japanese nuclear weapons capability, though such
voices continued to encounter substantial opposition
from the prevailing anti-nuclear sentiment in Japanese
public life. 27 While these recommendations were
not heeded, Asian allied governments did make clear
that they still regarded the nuclear guarantee as central
<strong>and</strong> indispensable <strong>and</strong> pressed Washington to redouble
its nuclear umbrella guarantees. 28
By the early 2010s, then, while U.S. nuclear weapons
had receded to the background of active U.S. se-
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