Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Europe <strong>and</strong> East Asia to sign the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon
states without the willingness of the United
States to extend nuclear deterrent guarantees to
them. Given the inherent risks involved in such guarantees,
however, allies still worry about whether U.S.
promises would be bankable in times of war. Those
European allies who believe that they are most at risk
have therefore historically placed a high premium on
evidence that the U.S. guarantee is credible, including
the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons.
Were the United States, along with Russia, to reduce
the size of its nuclear arsenal to a level closer to
those of the smaller nuclear weapon states, it would
not necessarily require an end to forward deployment
of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. It would be hard to
justify retaining the current level of such forces, which
(at 150-200 warheads) is comparable to the total arsenal
of the UK. If it were thought desirable to do so as
a signal of extended deterrence credibility, however,
the retention of a much smaller force (say 10 or 20
warheads) would be compatible in principle with a
smaller overall U.S. arsenal.
If Russia were to make steep reductions in its
own nuclear force, however, support for maintaining
even a small U.S. nuclear force in Europe is likely to
diminish, even among the more “exposed” alliance
members such as Pol<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Baltic republics. It
is possible to imagine a scenario in which deep cuts
in U.S. <strong>and</strong> Russian global forces still left a few U.S.
weapons in Europe. It is more likely that European
<strong>NATO</strong> members will see such cuts as an opportunity
to overcome their divisions on this difficult issue, <strong>and</strong>
end this deployment entirely.
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