Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

taining effective verification mechanisms. They insist
on the necessity to take into account during negotiations
not just U.S. <strong>and</strong> Russian TNWs, but the nuclear
arsenals of other countries of the region as well:
Russia’s position should be based on the evident fact
that TNW is a weapon of regional deterrence, <strong>and</strong>,
consequently, during the process of defining the parameters
of the Russian TNW arsenal for the purpose
of negotiations, the nuclear weapons of France, Great
Britain, Israel <strong>and</strong> Pakistan should be taken into account.
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RUSSIAN LINKAGE BETWEEN POLITICS AND
TNWs
As of this writing in 2012, the issue of reducing
TNWs is too politically sensitive for both sides, with
the Russian presidential election only just completed,
<strong>and</strong> the U.S. presidential election coming up in November.
Russia is falling significantly behind its two
major competitors—the United States <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong>—in
economic <strong>and</strong> technological areas <strong>and</strong> behind China
in terms of population <strong>and</strong> industrial potential. It is
therefore drawn in foreign policy matters to TNWs
as a political weapon, threatening to deploy tactical
nuclear-capable missiles in response either to <strong>NATO</strong>
enlargement to the East or to plans for BMD in Europe.
Furthermore, it is important to remember that the
nuclear weapon is one of the few or, many argue, the
only remaining credential supporting the superpower
status of Russia. Moscow almost lost this status after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Psychologically, it is
still a very important prop for Russians generally <strong>and</strong>
for the Russian leadership:
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