Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ganizational changes in recent years within the U.S.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as <strong>NATO</strong>’s
<strong>Nuclear</strong> Policy Directorate <strong>and</strong> Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) <strong>Nuclear</strong> Planning
office, have already marginalized the nuclear mission
to a considerable extent. The U.S. Air Force has never
liked this mission, <strong>and</strong> has little in the way of U.S.-
based DCA to back up mission requirements in Europe
or Asia. For example, recognizing the changed
international security environment, as well as these
organizational <strong>and</strong> operational changes, several years
ago <strong>NATO</strong> increased its minimum response time for
alert aircraft from minutes, as it was during the Cold
War, to weeks. 43
Finally, there are various schools of thought within
elite U.S. circles as to the value, role, <strong>and</strong> future of
NSNWs in Europe. These range from traditional supporters,
to believers in selective engagement, to proponents
of arms control, to disarmament advocates.
Professor David Yost has recently reviewed these distinctive
views <strong>and</strong> abstracted some of the key questions
under debate. 44
Any of the factors urging the elimination of the remaining
U.S. weapons in Europe could be accelerated
by more dramatic <strong>and</strong> immediate events, such as a
nuclear accident or incident in Europe involving U.S.
weapons, a decision to arbitrarily end the U.S. mission
(by either the United States/<strong>NATO</strong> or one or more of
the host nation allies), or a decision to use the remaining
NSNWs as bargaining chips in arms control negotiations
with Russia. Any of these events would precipitate
a much more drastic <strong>and</strong> publicly supported
termination of the U.S. forward-deployed mission. To
do little or nothing, kicking the can down the road,
will allow the Alliance to maintain the status quo for a
344