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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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ground-launched short-range nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s, ceasing<br />

deployment of nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> naval surface<br />

vessels <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> attack submarines, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> withdrawing the<br />

vast bulk of U.S. weap<strong>on</strong>s from Europe <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> all U.S.<br />

nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s from South Korea. 23 While U.S. strategic<br />

nuclear forces <strong>on</strong> ballistic missile submarines<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> at missile <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> air bases in the United States still<br />

covered targets in Asia, these steps had the effect of<br />

completely removing U.S. nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s from visibility<br />

in Asia.<br />

In the years following 1991, U.S. nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s<br />

played <strong>on</strong>ly the most subdued role in Pacific security<br />

dynamics. Other than North Korea, which could<br />

threaten the United States <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> its allies <strong>on</strong>ly through<br />

asymmetric methods <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> by exploiting the leverage<br />

it enjoyed because it had so much less to lose than its<br />

prospering rivals, the United States <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> its allies faced<br />

no serious near-term threat in Asia during the 1990s<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000s. Especially after the U.S. armed forces’ performance<br />

in Operati<strong>on</strong> DESERT STORM, U.S. military<br />

superiority was so evident in the 1990s <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 2000s<br />

that there was no plausible c<strong>on</strong>tingency in Asia in<br />

which the United States would need to rely <strong>on</strong> nuclear<br />

weap<strong>on</strong>s for strictly military purposes. The overarching<br />

deterrent effects of nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s could be sustained,<br />

in the meantime, by the strategic forces of the<br />

United States. 24<br />

In the latter half of the 2000s, these trends began to<br />

abate, if not reverse. North Korea’s persistent pursuit<br />

of a nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s capability <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> advanced missile<br />

programs, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> its aggressive <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> provocative behavior<br />

in sinking the South Korean ship Che<strong>on</strong>an <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

shelling Ye<strong>on</strong>gbye<strong>on</strong>g Isl<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>, rattled both Seoul <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Tokyo. Meanwhile, capitals throughout the Western<br />

Pacific, above all Tokyo, were becoming increasingly<br />

85

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