Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ope is illustrative of a more fundamental problem of
strategic incoherence that plagues both <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> the
European Union (EU). Both institutions have engaged
in sophisticated forms of obfuscation in order to reconcile
the multiple interests <strong>and</strong> concerns of their
member states <strong>and</strong> preserve maximum policy flexibility.
For example, <strong>NATO</strong>’s 2010 Strategic Concept drops
the specific commitment of its predecessor (the 1999
Strategic Concept) to maintain the dual-capable aircraft
(DCA) that serve as the delivery systems for the
forward-deployed TNWs. This kind of commitment
avoidance makes sense from a diplomatic point of
view, but it is at the expense of the Alliance’s strategic
clarity.
The second factor that contributes to the impasse
over the future of TNWs is fundamental disagreement
within <strong>NATO</strong> about the removal or retention
of these systems. At the core of this disagreement are
the positions taken by the two leading nations of the
EU. France, which still celebrates its force de frappe
as a source of status <strong>and</strong> security, is opposed to the
removal of TNWs from Europe, or any significant
change in <strong>NATO</strong>’s strategic doctrine, because such
action might make it harder for Paris to maintain its
own nuclear posture. This position has placed France
in direct conflict with Germany, which has taken on
the role of leader of the Alliance’s pro-nuclear disarmament
wing. All other European <strong>NATO</strong> members
have staked out positions between these two poles, or
avoided making commitments. The chapters by Paolo
Foradori <strong>and</strong> Götz Neuneck in this section provide
readers with information on where most of the major
European <strong>NATO</strong> allies are located on this continuum.
The third barrier to progress is the role played by
Russia in the evolving debate over TNWs. Or perhaps
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