Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

II. 1953-1963. U.S. STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY:
EISENHOWER OPTS FOR
“MASSIVE RETALIATION.”
After assuming office in early 1953, the administration
of former General Dwight Eisenhower raised
U.S. <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong> dependence on nuclear weapons to
a new level. As a fiscal conservative, Eisenhower saw
nuclear weapons as a strategically acceptable <strong>and</strong> decisively
cheaper alternative to conventional forces. He
believed in planning for the long competition between
liberal democracy <strong>and</strong> communism by balancing security
<strong>and</strong> solvency. Increasing reliance on the much
more cost-effective firepower provided by TNWs was
consequently a key aspect of Eisenhower’s New Look
strategy, which developed out of U.S. NSC Paper NSC
162/2 of October 1953. 15 (The U.S. doctrine was also frequently
referred to as “Massive Retaliation,” although
Eisenhower himself disliked the term.) Eisenhower
also judged—probably, it now seems, wrongly—that
his threats of nuclear use if the peace talks continued
to stall in Korea had been decisive in persuading the
Chinese <strong>and</strong> North Koreas to agree to armistice terms
a few months later.
TNWs <strong>and</strong> the Economics of Massive Retaliation.
When Eisenhower took office, the United States
had only about 1,000 nuclear weapons. Massive retaliation
needed far more. Orders were placed for
the weapons with the Atomic Energy Commission at
enormous cost. By the time outlays reached their peak
during the Eisenhower era, the Commission was consuming
some 10 percent of the total federal budget.
By the mid-1950s, a “nuclear production complex”
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