Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

maintaining these weapons or their associated DCA.
This scenario would probably lead to a new <strong>and</strong> acrimonious
burden-sharing debate at a time when all
allied governments are facing intense economic problems,
when public support for the Alliance is soft, <strong>and</strong>
when the United States is becoming increasingly preoccupied
with the Asia-Pacific region. 2 A second, <strong>and</strong>
perhaps related, risk is that <strong>NATO</strong> governments will
lose control of the issue of TNWs in Europe as a result
of political or extra-political actions by anti-nuclear
movements. The chapter by Nick Childs in this section
should alert readers to how vulnerable European
governments are to this type of scenario.
The issue of TNWs in Europe is one of those rare
cases in international politics where the process by
which a decision is made is probably more important
than the specific decision itself. If the current impasse
could be sustained indefinitely, then <strong>NATO</strong> would
have little reason for concern. But a number of factors
are converging to undermine this prospect. <strong>NATO</strong> policymakers,
who are currently drafting the Deterrence
<strong>and</strong> Defense Posture Review (DDPR) to address (among
other things) the future of tactical nuclear weapons in
Europe, are very aware of the potential risks associated
with political mismanagement of the TNW issue.
But as Simon Lunn observes in his insightful analysis
of the DDPR in this section, “The key differences
over nuclear policy that required the compromise in
the first place have already resurfaced, making both
progress <strong>and</strong> the final outcome difficult to foresee.” 3
Hopefully the <strong>NATO</strong> representatives who are drafting
this document are approaching their task with the
appropriate sense of urgency.
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