Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

suited to countering the main international threats to
Euro-Atlantic security, <strong>and</strong> serious credibility problems
are raised by their low operational readiness,
their vulnerability to surprise attacks, <strong>and</strong> the limited
range of dual-capable aircraft. 1 The most explicit
manifestation of this point of view was proposed by
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, who
conditioned his support for Angela Merkel’s coalition
government after the elections of November 2009 on
its definite commitment to eliminating TNWs, which
he described as “a relic of the Cold War . . . [that] no
longer serves a military purpose.” 2
With the end of the Cold War <strong>and</strong> the collapse
of the archenemy against whom the U.S. bombs in
Europe were first deployed, the original purpose of
TNWs has vanished, <strong>and</strong> their current military role
appears ill-defined at best. 3 <strong>NATO</strong> itself declares that
its “nuclear forces no longer target any country” 4
because it “does not consider any country to be its
adversary.” 5 The Alliance’s present ability to defuse
a crisis through diplomatic <strong>and</strong> other means or, if
needed, to mount a successful conventional defense,
has significantly improved. Although an appropriate
combination of nuclear <strong>and</strong> conventional capabilities
remains a “core element” 6 of <strong>NATO</strong>’s current deterrence
strategy, “the circumstances in which any use of
nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are
extremely remote.” 7 In the words of the 2010 <strong>NATO</strong>
Strategic Concept:
Since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically
reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in
Europe <strong>and</strong> our reliance on nuclear weapons in <strong>NATO</strong>
strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further
reductions in the future. 8
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