Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

<strong>NATO</strong> WILL SURVIVE—WHATEVER HAPPENS
TO NSNWS
The politics of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe are
now as much about reassuring the United States that
its non-nuclear allies are not taking advantage of its
generosity as about reassuring its allies that the United
States will come to their aid if required. Indeed, these
two requirements are closely interrelated. Were the
United States to conclude that it was no longer worth
offering protection to its allies because those allies are
unwilling to do enough for their own defense, then the
alliance would be damaged beyond repair. In this context,
some in the United States argue, dem<strong>and</strong>s from
European countries for the removal of nuclear weapons
from their territory risk undermining support for
<strong>NATO</strong> within the United States. Why should the United
States risk its own cities in the event of a major war
in Europe, they suggest, if European governments are
not prepared to bear the political costs of basing U.S.
nuclear forces on their territory? Nor is this seen as a
uniquely nuclear phenomenon. European opposition
to U.S. nuclear forces on their territory is often seen
as part of a wider process of demilitarization, evident
also in the lower levels of spending on conventional
forces by European governments.
Yet <strong>NATO</strong> is stronger than some of its American
critics believe. Its European members have been prepared
to deploy significant numbers of their armed
forces to Afghanistan, despite widespread public
opposition to the war at home. They have done so,
primarily, in order to show solidarity with the United
States. In turn, the United States was prepared to
make a vital contribution to <strong>NATO</strong>’s recent campaign
in Libya, where France <strong>and</strong> the UK played the leading
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