Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

in its interest for <strong>NATO</strong> to be divided on this question,
moreover, it may be less inclined to agree to a process
that would allow the Alliance to unite around a new
approach.
Recent political unrest in Russia, however, suggests
that it may be too soon for <strong>NATO</strong> to ab<strong>and</strong>on
the search for accommodation. A now reelected, but
weakened, President Vladimir Putin might come to be
convinced—perhaps in response to growing economic
weakness—that it was in Russia’s interests to resume
<strong>and</strong> deepen the “reset” process. If he does so decide,
a renewed attempt to achieve mutual reductions in
non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) might not be
a bad place to start.
It might be easier to achieve agreement on NSNW
reciprocation than on missile defense, the primary focus
of <strong>NATO</strong>/Russia efforts over the last year. <strong>NATO</strong>
Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is right to
believe that agreement on missile defense cooperation
would be a “game-changer,” opening up the path to a
fundamental restructuring of relations between Russia
<strong>and</strong> the Alliance. 1 But, precisely because this is the
case, such an agreement would also have to involve
some fundamental changes in strategic approach by
both Russia <strong>and</strong> the United States, the conditions for
which may not yet exist. Russia is still very reluctant
to agree on a cooperative approach that could give political
legitimacy to the wider U.S. missile defense program,
fearing that this would hasten the day in which
its own strategic missile force came under threat. The
United States, for its part, is unwilling to provide binding
assurances that it will not develop missile defense
capabilities that could threaten Russia’s long-range
missiles. Even if the current administration were to
do so, Russia could not be confident (given its expe-
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