Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the existing
stockpile of Russian NSNWs, which is but a remnant
of the Soviet stockpile, does not reflect any conscious
military <strong>and</strong> political decisions. Instead, it is a residuum
of inertia <strong>and</strong> lacks a discernible mission. Moreover,
Russian resistance to any dialogue on NSNWs
is a result of domestic politics rather than a desire to
protect a valuable asset.
NUMBERS
The size of the Russian NSNW stockpile is notoriously
difficult to assess. This author has previously estimated
the active stockpile at around 2,000 warheads
with perhaps as many as double that number slated
for elimination. 2 That figure closely corresponds with
the assessment of Hans Kristensen <strong>and</strong> Robert Norris. 3
While Russia has not provided any official numbers,
it has disclosed that the NSNW force was reduced by
75 percent since the adoption of Presidential <strong>Nuclear</strong>
Initiatives (PNIs) in 1991. 4 If one accepts the high-end
estimate of the Soviet NSNW arsenal in 1991 as almost
22,000, 5 the figure for the late 2000s should be
5,000 warheads, which closely matches the Sokov <strong>and</strong>
Kristensen-Norris estimates of the entire stockpile, including
weapons waiting to be dismantled. It is also
possible that the number of weapons slated for dismantlement
might be even higher.
Perhaps more important than sheer numbers is
the breakdown of the stockpile into categories, which
taken together define the non-strategic nuclear posture.
Speaking in 2007, General Vladimir Verkhovtsev
disclosed that Russia had completed elimination of
warheads assigned to the ground forces, which had
been promised in 1991 through PNIs by George H. W.
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