Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

cussed above. Indeed, the very concept of nuclear deterrence
is now dismissed as a Cold War relic. Many
in the disarmament movement reject the very notion
of deterrence. They downplay or ignore the many
other important <strong>and</strong> complex roles nuclear weapons
play in ensuring the collective security of the Alliance.
Former Secretary of State George Schultz at the Global
Zero meeting in California asked, “How good of a deterrent
is a nuclear weapon anyhow? What threat are
they deterring? I don’t see much usefulness myself.” 18
Some “Global Zero” advocates have singled out the
extended worldwide deterrence commitment of the
United States, calling it, in the words of Barry Blechman,
“a concept that served a vital purpose during the
Cold War, but whose time has come—<strong>and</strong> gone. The
first step towards nuclear abolition is eliminating reliance
on nuclear deterrence.” 19
While the effectiveness of deterrence remains difficult
to prove other than through anecdotal examples,
Kenneth Waltz pointed out in his classic study, Man,
the State, <strong>and</strong> War (1959), that:
deterrence arises from a logical <strong>and</strong> a moral necessity.
Because men are not angels, because states can be
malevolent, <strong>and</strong> because the international system of
states is itself a jungle, without an all-powerful world
government to enforce order, something like deterrence
is required. Deterrence is reason’s attempt to
check the perpetual temptation of evil. 20
And, as Edmund Burke warned: “The only thing
necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to
do nothing.” 21 This evil includes the assumption that
men will lie, cheat, <strong>and</strong> betray. Since the search for
perfect security is a fool’s err<strong>and</strong> in a world inherently
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