Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

CHAPTER 23
SUMMING UP AND ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
Tom Nichols
Douglas Stuart
Jeffrey D. McCausl<strong>and</strong>
The authors <strong>and</strong> analysts who participated in this
conference set themselves a difficult task: to consider
the role <strong>and</strong> future of tactical or non-strategic nuclear
weapons (NSNWs) in the North Atlantic alliance.
Their answers cover a range of views, but at least two
salient conclusions emerge from this volume. First, it
should be evident that in the more than 2 decades since
the end of the Cold War, the problem itself—that is,
the question of what to do with weapons designed in
a previous century for the possibility of a World War
III—is understudied, both inside <strong>and</strong> outside of government.
<strong>Tactical</strong> weapons, although less awesome
than their strategic siblings, carry significant security
<strong>and</strong> political risks, <strong>and</strong> they have not received the attention
that is commensurate with their importance.
Second, it is clear that whatever the future of these
arms, the status quo is unacceptable. It is past the time
for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (<strong>NATO</strong>)
to make more resolute decisions, a coherent strategy,
<strong>and</strong> more definite plans about its nuclear status.
These decisions are fundamental to the identity of
<strong>NATO</strong>. The United States <strong>and</strong> its closest allies must
define what, exactly, the Alliance believes constitute
its greatest threats in the future, <strong>and</strong> in doing so must
clarify <strong>NATO</strong>’s identity, purpose, <strong>and</strong> corresponding
force requirements. So far, <strong>NATO</strong> remains a “nuclear
alliance,” but it is increasingly hard to define what
507