Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

withdrawal as part of a wider disengagement trend
that could undermine the credibility of <strong>NATO</strong>’s collective
defense commitments. Their concerns are also
shared by France, which has been consistently sceptical
of the Obama administration’s commitment to
global nuclear disarmament.
As this debate continues, the primary concern of
most <strong>NATO</strong> member states has been to find a consensus
on this contentious issue in order to be able to focus
on other risks—the problems in Afghanistan, the
uncertainties in the Arab world, the security implications
of the financial crisis—that are of more pressing
concern to the Alliance. The central theme that has
emerged from these efforts at consensus-building—
<strong>and</strong> was reflected in <strong>NATO</strong>’s 2010 Strategic Concept—
has been the desirability of finding ways in which
the future of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe can be
addressed as part of a process of mutual reductions
with Russia. Those governments that would prefer the
removal of these weapons are, at least for now, willing
to explore whether it is possible to get something
from Russia in return. And those who support their
continuing presence view the commitment to reciprocation
as a way to head off the prospect of further
unilateral reductions.
With key basing countries reluctant to commit to
hosting U.S. weapons in the longer term, there are
questions about how much can realistically be obtained
from Russia in return for their removal. As long
as confrontation with the United States <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong> is
seen to be fulfilling a useful domestic political role,
Russia’s government may be unwilling to enter into
any new agreement—whether on nuclear arms control
or on missile defense cooperation—that would signal
a reduction in this tension. As long as Russia sees it as
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