Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ole in pushing for United Nations (UN) <strong>and</strong> alliance
action. Neither operation suggests an alliance in terminal
crisis or decline.
The argument that the United States is about to
ab<strong>and</strong>on its interest in Europe in order to focus entirely
on the Asia Pacific, is similarly overblown. After a
decade in which the U.S. military has been focused on
fighting difficult ground wars in Iraq <strong>and</strong> Afghanistan,
some rebalancing is both inevitable <strong>and</strong> desirable. But
it is far from clear that U.S. interest in Europe’s restive
neighborhood—the Mediterranean, the Middle
East, <strong>and</strong> sub-Saharan Africa—is about to decline.
Confrontation with Iran remains a central element in
U.S. strategy, bringing with it an intensification of relationships
with Iran’s Arab rivals on the other side
of the Gulf. U.S military involvements in Africa—for
example, in Somalia, Kenya, <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a—are deepening,
not declining. Irrespective of what its European
allies do, the United States, for good or ill, seems to
be committed to remaining a major military power in
Europe’s backyard.
Concerns over the impact of the NSNW debate on
<strong>NATO</strong>’s future are also at risk of being overblown.
While there may be a temptation to draw comparisons
with the 1980s Euro-missile debate, the current nuclear
discussion within <strong>NATO</strong> is a pale echo of that period.
Taking place in the shadow of worsening Soviet/U.S.
relations, <strong>and</strong> with mass anti-nuclear demonstrations
taking place across Europe, the Euro-missile crisis of
the 1980s was rightly a central focus for intra-alliance
concern. Today, in a Europe where major war is no
longer the central security concern, <strong>and</strong> where the
continuing presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on the
continent had been almost forgotten until recently,
apathy is a more common reaction than antagonism.
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