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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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the United States was expected to fly missi<strong>on</strong>s against<br />

Russia, as well as against comm<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>trol centers.<br />

Targets featured in these simulati<strong>on</strong>s were located<br />

throughout Europe, the Pacific, South-East Asia,<br />

Indian Ocean, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> even the c<strong>on</strong>tinental United States.<br />

Short-range weap<strong>on</strong>s (such as tactical l<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>-based missiles<br />

or tactical aircraft) could not reach these targets.<br />

Instead, simulati<strong>on</strong>s featured medium <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> heavy<br />

bombers carrying gravity bombs, short-range missiles,<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> warheads for submarine launched cruise<br />

missiles of various ranges, which are stored in<br />

12th Glavnoye Upravleniye Ministerstvo Obor<strong>on</strong>y<br />

(GUMO) 13 facilities at naval bases, appear to be another<br />

comp<strong>on</strong>ent of the forces Russia could use in a c<strong>on</strong>flict<br />

with <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Russian naval comm<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>ers admit that<br />

they simply cannot c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>t the U.S. Navy—in the<br />

case of a direct clash between Russia <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the United<br />

States—without reliance <strong>on</strong> these assets. Accordingly,<br />

crews of surface ships <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> submarines have reportedly<br />

trained to mate warheads to SLCMs <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> launch<br />

them. 14 In fact, Vice-Admiral Oleg Burtsev, deputy<br />

chief of the Navy’s Main Staff, declared that the role of<br />

TNWs <strong>on</strong> attack nuclear submarines would increase.<br />

“The range of tactical nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s is growing, as<br />

is their accuracy. They do not need to deliver highyield<br />

warheads; instead it is possible to make a transiti<strong>on</strong><br />

to low-yield nuclear warheads that could be<br />

installed <strong>on</strong> the existing types of cruise missiles,” he<br />

asserted. 15<br />

The 2010 Military Doctrine did not change these<br />

provisi<strong>on</strong>s. The missi<strong>on</strong> of de-escalati<strong>on</strong> was apparently<br />

not even discussed in depth, at least not at the<br />

public level; attenti<strong>on</strong> was c<strong>on</strong>centrated almost exclusively<br />

<strong>on</strong> the new attempt at military reform. The <strong>on</strong>ly<br />

210

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