Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

likely determined by the limited capacity of
warhead dismantlement processes. It is impossible
to determine what the end goal is or
whether Russia even has a clear-cut development
plan for the ultimate size of the NSNW
force. It appears possible that no such determination
has yet been made. Reductions proceed
in a piecemeal fashion, much as the United
States gradually reduced its NSNW force in
Europe over the last 2 decades.
• The changes in the composition of the NSNW
arsenal hint at the degree of utility assigned
to different categories. Clearly, the naval warheads
represent the most valuable element of
the arsenal while the ground forces no longer
need them (at least the military <strong>and</strong> political
leaderships do not see value in nuclear missions
for these forces). The same might be true
for the missile defense <strong>and</strong> air defense NSNWs,
although information about these categories
is very sketchy. Non-strategic missions for the
Air Force seem to occupy the middle ground
between these two extremes.
Evolutionary trends of the NSNW arsenals will
be treated in greater depth in the next section. At the
moment, the most important conclusion is that the
NSNW arsenal will continue to shrink, <strong>and</strong> the gap
between the American <strong>and</strong> the Russian NSNW forces
will slowly narrow on their own accord without extraordinary
action on the part of the United States <strong>and</strong>
<strong>NATO</strong>.
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