Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

German territory. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, Germany has
accepted the principle that there will be no unilateral
change. So Bonn probably hopes that nuclear weapons
will not in the end be a dominating or defining
issue in Chicago even as it continues to worry that it
will remain hostage to that possibility.
Germany’s troubled attitude may ultimately be
shared by most of the European members of <strong>NATO</strong>
as well. So what seems to be in the offing is continuing
compromise, an elaboration perhaps, but no more,
on the Clinton/Tallinn formula. The problem is that
this compromise will not satisfy either side in the debate.
For those attached to a “nuclear zero,” it will be
a missed opportunity. For those who see an enduring
role for the weapons, it will presage continuing danger
to <strong>NATO</strong>’s cohesion <strong>and</strong> nuclear posture, <strong>and</strong> all
the more so given that, with the current public mood,
there is no realistic possibility of the Alliance’s European
members accepting the idea of stationing updated
nuclear weapons on their territory.
In these circumstances, what is really a political
issue may, by the choice of the political leaderships,
spiral down to a technical matter <strong>and</strong> be dealt with
by default. Again, the principal focus is on Germany
<strong>and</strong> the lack of any dual-capable successor to its current
Tornado strike aircraft. But there is also lingering
uncertainty for those current B-61 hosts, the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s,
<strong>and</strong> Italy, whose future combat aircraft choice,
the F-35 Lightning, may have been designed with dual
capability in mind but which as a project may yet face
an uncertain future.
However the tactical nuclear debate unfolds in the
run-up to the Chicago summit <strong>and</strong> beyond, there is
still a palpable sense that it has only just begun.
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