Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

to direct Russian toward multilateral solutions to its
security.
The third <strong>and</strong> most directly related factor underlying
the Russian position on NSNWs relates to what we
might call the military maladies of the Russian armed
forces. As we saw above, new efforts on military reform
began following the 2008 war with Georgia. This
is probably no accident, <strong>and</strong> so Russian activities in
the so-called 5-day war provide a good example of a
number of things related to the Russian military. For
instance, even though Russian forces had been stationed
in the Northern Caucasus <strong>and</strong> had engaged in
military exercises prior to August 2008, the Russian
military still appeared to be caught by surprise when
the Georgians attacked on August 7. Russian analyst
Fyodor Lukyanov puts the blame squarely on inconsistencies
in Russian policy, which, taken together
with other factors listed below, served to cause hesitation
<strong>and</strong> to limit what the Russians could actually do
once the war began. As Lykyanov noted at the time of
the war:
Ever since the disruption of the status quo that had
been maintained in the conflict zones for about 10
years, Russia’s policy has been getting increasingly
contradictory. The desire to simultaneously play the
role of a neutral mediator/peacekeeper <strong>and</strong> a protector/guarantor
of security in South Ossetia <strong>and</strong> Abkhazia
has been detrimental to both the former <strong>and</strong>
the latter status. At some point, Moscow essentially
stopped trying to help bring about a political settlement,
placing its stakes on exp<strong>and</strong>ing cooperation
with Tskhinvali <strong>and</strong> Sukhumi <strong>and</strong> forestalling any
outbreaks of tension. At the same time, Russia tried
to formally stay within existing legal bounds, <strong>and</strong> the
longer this went on, the more it came into conflict with
reality. 14
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