Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

12. And probably unknown to the French colonial authorities.
See James J. Heaphey, Legerdemain: The President’s Secret Plan, the
Bomb <strong>and</strong> What the French Never Knew, New York: History Publishing
Company, 2007.
13. “The weight of the fragmentary evidence [about Soviet
strategy during the Stalin years] lends support to its defensive
rather than offensive character. . . . The 1951 operational plan
of the Polish Army [mentioned] only defensive operations. The
same was true about contemporary Czechoslovak plans.” Vojtech
Mastny, “Imagining War in Europe,” in Mastny, Holtsmark, <strong>and</strong>
Wenger, eds., 2006, p. 16.
14. Based upon newly available archival documentation from
Eastern Europe, “The Western strategy of nuclear deterrence . . .
appears . . . irrelevant to deterring a major war that the enemy
did not wish to launch in the first place.” Mastny, “Introduction,”
Mastny, Holtsmark, <strong>and</strong> Wenger, 2006, p. 3.
15. McMahon, pp. 288-297.
16. Richard Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the <strong>Nuclear</strong>
Arms Race, New York: Simon <strong>and</strong> Schuster, 2007, p. 79.
17. Charles S Maier, “The World Economy <strong>and</strong> the Cold War
in the Middle of the 20th Century,” in Leffler <strong>and</strong> Wested, eds.,
2010, p. 64.
18. Wheeler, p. 126.
19. Ibid., p. 127.
20. Freedman, p. 203.
21. Gordon S. Barrass, The Great Cold War: A Journey Through
the Hall of Mirrors, Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, Stanford
University Press, 2009, p. 112.
22. Ibid.
23. Wheeler, p. 127.
66