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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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Government must ensure the c<strong>on</strong>tinued safety <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> security<br />

of its homel<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> populati<strong>on</strong> against attack.<br />

The questi<strong>on</strong> is whether extended deterrence, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

NSNW commitments to allies, can help achieve this<br />

goal. Some would argue that making commitments to<br />

overseas friends <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> allies against potential adversaries<br />

actually makes the United States more susceptible<br />

to threats, blackmail, or the risk of involvment in a<br />

c<strong>on</strong>flict.<br />

Sec<strong>on</strong>d, the United States wants to c<strong>on</strong>tinue assuring<br />

its allies of their security, maintain its alliances<br />

around the world, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> provide a stabilizing presence<br />

where needed. But it must weigh those desiderata<br />

against the possibility that anti-nuclear or even anti-<br />

American attitudes could arise within allied societies<br />

if it were to choose to retain or modernize its forwarddeployed<br />

nuclear forces in Europe. On the other side<br />

of the world, the United States faces the exact opposite<br />

dilemma: allied c<strong>on</strong>cerns in East Asia may be raised by<br />

a perceived diminuti<strong>on</strong> of U.S. guarantees, as evinced<br />

by a lack of will or lack of the visible wherewithal<br />

to provide extended deterrence. In either case, the<br />

Obama administrati<strong>on</strong> faces the possibility of frustrating<br />

key allied states in order to follow through <strong>on</strong> its<br />

Prague visi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the NPR’s commitments. Moreover,<br />

c<strong>on</strong>vincing allies of U.S. resolve may not be possible in<br />

any case simply by pointing to existing capabilities. 50<br />

Alliance cohesi<strong>on</strong> is a fragile thing, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> could be jeopardized<br />

by U.S. missteps even <strong>on</strong> the level of nuance.<br />

Third, the U.S. Government also wants to manage<br />

change in the internati<strong>on</strong>al system to avoid potential<br />

downsides. Downsides might include a loss of global<br />

influence, diminished security (particularly if rogue<br />

states or n<strong>on</strong>state actors become more empowered as<br />

a result of diminished U.S. influence), or a loss of face<br />

in the event our commitment to President Obama’s<br />

347

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