Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

homel<strong>and</strong>. The traditional U.S. rationale for extended
deterrence has been to attempt to address the danger
as far as possible from its shores, fighting, if necessary,
an “away game.” Of course, flexible extended deterrence
does not have to be accomplished with nuclear
weapons. During the Cold War, however, the two
concepts were nearly always synonymous, <strong>and</strong> many
of today’s analyses still conflate the two ideas. In any
case, when the United States chooses to give a security
guarantee to another state, that commitment will
include all measures of defense up to <strong>and</strong> including
nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent. Cold War
historian John Lewis Gaddis called this type of commitment
“active deterrence” because it took a willful
decision by the nuclear state to make such a guarantee.
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The purpose of extended deterrence during the
Cold War was to provide security for America’s allies.
This required the United States to convince potential
adversaries—meaning primarily the Soviet
Union—that U.S. security commitments were genuine,
<strong>and</strong> that they would be carried out if necessary.
In addition, extended deterrence served a number of
additional purposes. It induced caution among the
nuclear players on the world stage; it discouraged adventurism,
not only by the nuclear states but by those
protected by the guarantee; <strong>and</strong> it may have helped
to prevent nuclear proliferation among the allies. This
latter point was part of the gr<strong>and</strong> alliance bargain that
the United States struck with its European allies (except
France <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>, of course): in return for a security
guarantee, they agreed not to pursue their own
nuclear capabilities. 7 This same bargain was in place
in Northeast Asia for the purpose of keeping allies
such as Japan, South Korea, <strong>and</strong> Taiwan nuclear-free.
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